The Impact of Thin-Capitalization Rules on Multinationals’ Financing and Investment Decisions by Buettner, Thiess et al.
Dis cus si on Paper No. 06-068
The Impact of Thin-Capitalization Rules 
on Multinationals’ Financing 
and Investment Decisions
Thiess Buettner, Michael Overesch, 
Ulrich Schreiber and Georg Wamser
Dis cus si on Paper No. 06-068
The Impact of Thin-Capitalization Rules 
on Multinationals’ Financing 
and Investment Decisions
Thiess Buettner, Michael Overesch, 
Ulrich Schreiber and Georg Wamser
Die Dis cus si on Pape rs die nen einer mög lichst schnel len Ver brei tung von 
neue ren For schungs arbei ten des ZEW. Die Bei trä ge lie gen in allei ni ger Ver ant wor tung 
der Auto ren und stel len nicht not wen di ger wei se die Mei nung des ZEW dar.
Dis cus si on Papers are inten ded to make results of ZEW  research prompt ly avai la ble to other 
eco no mists in order to encou ra ge dis cus si on and sug gesti ons for revi si ons. The aut hors are sole ly 
respon si ble for the con tents which do not neces sa ri ly repre sent the opi ni on of the ZEW.
Download this ZEW Discussion Paper from our ftp server:
ftp://ftp.zew.de/pub/zew-docs/dp/dp06068.pdf
Non-Technical Summary
Tax planning of multinational corporations receives a lot of attention by tax administra-
tion and policy-makers. Well-known strategies of tax deferral, transfer pricing, or the use
of intercompany loans in order to finance investment and many more, often rather com-
plex, strategies are often feared to erode the corporation tax base. The adverse revenue
consequences are a temptation for tax policy to change details in the tax law or its ad-
ministration and sometimes restrict the use of certain types of tax-planning. However, it
is not obvious that an attempt to restrict tax-planning is very effective. Moreover, if it is
effective, it is not clear that the corporations’ response to a restriction is generally bene-
ficial for the imposing country. Since, as has been discussed in the theoretical literature,
restricting certain opportunities for tax-planning might result in adverse consequences for
the level of investment undertaken by multinationals in high-tax countries which may also
reinforce tax-competition.
One particularly important element in multinational corporations’ tax-planning is their
ability to structure the finances in terms of debt and equity not only for the corporation as
a whole but also internally. Apart from the direct revenue losses, enhanced opportunities
for saving taxes may give the multinational an advantage against companies operating
only at a national level. For those reasons, governments often impose restrictions on the
capital structure choice. In fact, the imposition of so called Thin-Capitalization rules,
which deny interest deductions on intercompany debt if the debt-equity ratio or interest
expenses exceed certain thresholds, is widespread. However, evidence on the effects of
restrictions on corporate financing and investment decisions is generally lacking.
This paper investigates the effects of Thin-Capitalization rules on multinationals’ financing
and investment decisions. A theoretical model considers the financing and investment
decisions of a multinational corporation and shows the basic consequences of imposing
Thin-Capitalization rules for the debt-asset ratio as well as for the level of investment. The
theoretical model indicates that the positive effect of local taxes on leverage is reduced if
a Thin-Capitalization rule is imposed. Moreover, it is shown that a Thin-Capitalization
rule leads to a higher tax sensitivity of investment decisions.
The empirical analysis employs a comprehensive micro-level panel database of virtually
all German multinationals made available for research by the German Bundesbank. The
results show a significant positive impact of local taxes on the financial structure but also
an adverse impact of Thin-Capitalization rules indicating that these rules are effective to
some extent. Moreover, investment is found to be more sensitive to taxes if debt finance
is restricted supporting the theoretical concerns about reinforced tax competition.
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1 Introduction
While all companies can be expected to respond to taxation and capital market conditions
with their financing and investment decisions, transnational or, in general, multinational cor-
porations seem to have enhanced opportunities to do so. This includes well-known strategies
of tax deferral, transfer pricing, or the use of intercompany loans in order to finance in-
vestment but extends to many more, often rather complex, strategies. While it is difficult
to assess to which extent the transnational corporations’ efforts in tax-planning activities
contribute to the low turnout of corporate tax revenue in countries like the US or Germany,
at least for the case of the US, tax-planning by multinationals seems to be an important
factor (Gravelle, 2004, Desai, 2005). The adverse revenue consequences are a temptation
for tax policy to change details in the tax law or its administration and sometimes restrict
the use of certain types of tax-planning. However, the many dimensions along which the
multinational corporation can structure its activities have already let to rather complex na-
tional tax policies with regard to transnational activities (Gresik, 2001). In this situation,
it is not obvious that an attempt to restrict tax-planning is very effective. Moreover, if it is
effective, it is not clear that the corporations’ response to a restriction is generally beneficial
for the imposing country. Since, as has been discussed in the theoretical literature, restrict-
ing certain opportunities for tax-planning might result in adverse consequences for the level
of investment undertaken by multinationals in high-tax countries which may also reinforce
tax-competition (e.g., Keen, 2001, and Peralta, Wauthy, and van Yperserle, 2006, see also
Janeba and Smart, 2003, and Panteghini, 2006).
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One particularly important element in multinational corporations’ tax-planning is their abil-
ity to structure the finances in terms of debt and equity not only for the corporation as a
whole but also internally (Desai, Foley, and Hines, 2004). Apart from the direct revenue
losses, enhanced opportunities for saving taxes may give the multinational an advantage
against companies operating only at a national level. For those reasons, governments often
impose restrictions on the capital structure choice. In fact, the imposition of so called Thin-
Capitalization rules, which deny interest deductions on intercompany debt if the debt-equity
ratio or interest expenses exceed certain thresholds, is widespread. In 1996 half of the 24
OECD countries considered in the empirical analysis below have imposed those rules. Until
2004 the share has increased to almost 75%. Despite its widespread use, however, evidence
on the effects of restrictions on corporate financing and investment decisions is generally
lacking.
In this paper we investigate the effects of Thin-Capitalization rules on multinationals’ financ-
ing and investment decisions. A theoretical model shows the basic consequences of imposing
Thin-Capitalization rules on the subsidiary of a foreign corporation for the debt-asset ratio
as well as for the level of investment. The empirical analysis employs a comprehensive micro-
level panel database of virtually all German multinationals made available for research by
the German Bundesbank. As in the analysis of Desai, Foley, and Hines (2004) the panel data
structure and the possibility to identify all foreign affiliates belonging to the same multina-
tional allow us to control for the heterogeneity across companies. A further advantage of the
data is that under German tax law repatriated foreign profits are almost completely exempt
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from corporation taxes such that taxation at the location of the affiliate is decisive for the fi-
nancing and investment decisions of affiliates. The results show a significant positive impact
of local taxes on the financial structure but also an adverse impact of Thin-Capitalization
rules indicating that these rules are effective to some extent. Moreover, investment is found
to be more sensitive to taxes if debt finance is restricted supporting the theoretical concerns
about reinforced tax competition.
The paper is structured as follows. The next section provides a theoretical background
considering the financing and investment decisions of a multinational corporation and de-
rives empirical implications. More specifically, we model a company, active in two countries,
which uses equity and debt subject to the presence of Thin-Capitalization rules. Section 3
discusses the empirical implications for leverage and investment and discusses the investi-
gation approach. The subsequent sections provide an empirical analysis using panel-data
for the German multinationals in the period from 1996 until 2004. Section 4 gives a short
description of the dataset, before Section 5 presents the results. Section 6 contains the
conclusions.
2 Theoretical Background
Standard theories of the capital structure (e.g., Myers, 2001, Auerbach, 2002) emphasize that
in making their capital structure choice corporations trade off the gains from an increase in
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the leverage, obtained through a larger interest deduction from taxable profits, against the
increase in the agency cost of debt, reflecting the inability to solve potential conflict between
equity and debt claimants by means of contracts. Assuming that a corporation has more
than one location, this approach could be extended also to a transnational or multinational
company. However, in this case affiliates have improved access to credit as the company might
use intercompany loans rather than only external credit in order to increase the leverage of
affiliates in high-tax countries. The financing decision of the multinational corporation, thus,
may be particularly sensitive to local tax rates with adverse consequences for the local tax
revenue.
Facing the increased ability of multinational corporations to make use of the tax shield by
debt in high-tax countries, governments are tempted to restrict the use of debt by means of
Thin-Capitalization or Earning-Stripping rules. Those rules typically limit interest deduction
up to a fixed relation between equity and debt, usually qualified as the debt which is financed
by a shareholder, or deny the deduction of interest expenses above certain thresholds. Then,
the interest paid for an excess leverage cannot be deducted from the tax base. In practice,
Thin-Capitalization rules are often not limited to debt directly financed by shareholders.
Tax administration or legislation will usually also prohibit what is known as back-to-back
constructions, where the affiliate issues external debt, which is, however, guaranteed or
secured by a deposit from the parent-company.1 To keep the following discussion simple,
we will treat the Thin-Capitalization rule mostly as a restriction on debt finance without
1An example is constituted by the US Earnings Stripping rules (Sec. 163 (j) IRC).
4
always distinguishing between internal and external debt. Nevertheless, for the empirical
analysis we should keep in mind that Thin-Capitalization rules does not restrict the interest
deduction of all kinds of debt.
To derive the impact of Thin-Capitalization restrictions on corporate decisions we model
the decisions of a multinational company with two locations 1 and 2 which is assumed to
maximize the following profit function
pi = (1− τ1) f (k1) + (1− τ2) f (k2)
− [(1− τ1) i1λ1k1 + (1− τ2) i2λ2k2]
− [(1− λ1) k1 + (1− λ2) k2] r
− [c1 (λ1) k1 + c2 (λ2) k2]
− [(λ1 − λ1)ϕ1i1k1τ1 + (λ2 − λ2)ϕ2i2k2τ2] .
where f (kj) denotes the output at location j where kj units of capital are employed. τj is
the local tax rate on capital income. The second and third lines capture the interest and
opportunity cost of capital, where λj denotes the share of capital financed with debt, ij is
the rate of interest for debt issued in country j, and r indicates the opportunity cost of
equity capital. Before considering the profit function further, let us briefly discuss the tax
incentive for using a higher leverage. Suppose that i2 is not different from r. Then a shift
towards debt finance at location 2 (higher λ2) will tend to raise profits as a larger part of
the earnings of capital is tax deductible. Even in this situation the corporation will not
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finance all capital with debt due to the agency cost of debt. This is captured by the fourth
line, which introduces the agency cost determined by a function of each subsidiary’s debt-
equity ratio cj (λj).
2 In order to facilitate the analysis, the agency cost function is assumed
to be convex.3 The agency cost function is indexed with the host country to reflect the
potential role of this country’s credit-market regulations and conditions for the underlying
conflict between debtors and creditors. Note that the importance of this conflict might very
well also vary between firms. But, since we are concerned with a single firm, this is not
captured in the specification of the profit function. The imposition of a Thin-Capitalization
rule is reflected by the fifth line, where the profit function is extended to take account of
the additional tax payments arising from an excess leverage above the limit λj. In order
to consider cases with and without restrictions on the tax deduction of interest, we will set
ϕj = 1 if a Thin-Capitalization rule exists in country j and ϕj = 0, otherwise. If ϕj = 1,
the restriction imposed is binding when λj > λj.
For the optimum share of debt used by an affiliate, say firm 2, we obtain the first-order
2Note that the agency cost function is kept rather simple. A more general specification would allow for
cross-subsidiary effects of the leverage on the agency cost ci (λj , λi). However, if the own effect dominates
the empirical predictions would not change.
3More specifically,
cj,λ ≡ ∂cj
∂λj
> 0,
and
cj,λλ ≡ ∂
2cj
∂λ2j
> 0.
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condition
r − (1− τ2) i2 − ϕ2i2τ2 − c2,λ (λ2) != 0. (1)
Accordingly, the leverage is determined by the cost of equity relative to debt. If ϕ2 = 0 and
r > (1− τ2) i2, the convexity of c2 implies that λ2 is positive. In other words, if the after-tax
rate of interest is below the required return on equity, there will be some borrowing. If ϕ2
equals 1, the marginal cost of borrowing jumps up to i2 as the tax deduction is no longer
granted. As a consequence, the leverage λ2 is reduced. If r > i2 a leverage will still be
chosen above λ2, but if i2 > r > i2 (1− τ2) we have a corner solution such that the leverage
is chosen to be just equal to the threshold level λ2.
The first-order condition for the capital stock at location 2 is
(1− τ2) f ′ (k2)− (1− τ2)λ2i2 −
(
λ2 − λ2
)
ϕ2i2τ2 − (1− λ2) r − c2 (λ2) != 0. (2)
Accordingly, the stock of capital is chosen such that the after-tax marginal product equals
the marginal cost of the investment consisting of the interest cost (second and third term),
of the opportunity rate of return (fourth term), and of the agency cost of debt (last term).
Without restrictions on debt finance (ϕ2 = 0), the borrowing costs are reduced due to the tax
deduction. If a Thin-Capitalization rule is imposed and binding (ϕ2 = 1), the tax deduction
is limited, borrowing is more costly, and the costs of the investment are increased. The
consequence will be a lower level of investment.
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With regard to empirical implications it is important to note that the imposition of restric-
tions on debt finance will not only affect the capital structure and the level of investment
of capital; it will also affect the sensitivity of investment and leverage to the tax rate. The
tax sensitivity of investment is of particular interest, as it would usually be an important
determinant of a country’s tax policy. To study the impact on the tax sensitivity, let us
derive the comparative static effects of an increase in the tax rate by differentiating the two
first-order conditions while taking ϕj as parametric
 −c2,λλ 0
r − (1− τ2) i2 − ϕ2i2τ2 − c2,λ f ′′ (k2) (1− τ2)

 dλ2
dk2

=
 − (1− ϕ2) i2
f ′ (k2)− i2λ2 +
(
λ2 − λ2
)
ϕ2i2
 dτ2.
With regard to the tax effect on the leverage we can derive
dλ2
dτ2
=
(1− ϕ2) i2
c2,λλ
. (3)
First, consider the case without a Thin-Capitalization rule (ϕ2 = 0). Given the above
assumptions, the term is positive and the strength of the response depends on the interest
rate and on the agency cost function. But, if there is a Thin-Capitalization rule in place and
is binding (ϕ2 = 1), the tax rate effect disappears.
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With regard to the effect on the level of investment at location 2 we obtain
dk2
dτ2
=
f ′ (k2)− i2λ2 + ϕ2i2
(
λ2 − λ2
)
f ′′ (k2) (1− τ2) . (4)
To simplify matters let us consider the impact relative to the stock of capital
d log k2
dτ2
= − 1
(1− τ2) η2
[
1− i2λ2 − ϕ2i2
(
λ2 − λ2
)
f ′ (k2)
]
, (5)
where η2 = −f ′′(k2)k2f ′(k2) is the absolute value of the elasticity of the marginal product. If this
elasticity is non-decreasing in the level of capital k2,
4 we can state that the lower level of in-
vestment k2 and the lower deduction of interest cost under conditions of a Thin-Capitalization
rule (ϕ2 = 1) will lead to a higher tax sensitivity of the capital stock.
5 The intuition for
this result is that with lower tax deductions a larger part of the earnings is affected by the
corporation tax. The corporation tax exerts, therefore, stronger effects on investment.
The profit function utilized to derive these comparative static effects embodies the implicit
4This assumption is not particularly restrictive. With production function of Cobb-Douglas type, for
instance, the elasticity of the marginal product would be constant.
5To see this, note that the squared brackets on the right-hand side simplify to[
1− i2λ2
f ′ (k2)
]
, if ϕ = 0,
compared with [
1− i2λ2
f ′
(
k2
)] , if ϕ = 1,
where k2 is the amount of capital invested under financial constraints, which, as we know from the first-order
condition, cannot exceed k2. Thus, we know that i2λ2f ′(k2) is smaller than
i2λ2
f ′(k2)
, which proves our statement.
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assumption that the interest rate for the subsidiary located in, say, country 2 is the local rate
of interest i2. In case of an intercompany loan this seems questionable as the lending part
of the multinational could charge a different interest rate. In fact, if the firm could freely
determine financial transfers between its subsidiaries it could completely shift profits out of
the high-tax location (Mintz and Smart, 2005). Yet, under the arm’s length principle the
corporation would have to charge an interest rate not much different from the market rate.
Thus, if we assume that all debt at location 2 is internal, the profit function would differ
only in using the same interest rate at the lending and the borrowing part of the company,
i1 in our example. As long as the after-tax rate of interest is below the required return on
equity
r > (1− τ2) i1,
the comparative static effects are not changed, qualitatively. However, the empirical analysis
below is not focused on the impact of the interest rate and also does not distinguish between
internal and external debt. But, we should keep in mind that depending on the importance
of intercompany loans not only the local interest rate in the host country of the affiliate
matters but also that in other locations such as the parent’s country.
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3 Empirical Implications
The first–order conditions and the corresponding comparative static effects suggest that the
leverage of the affiliate in country j is a declining function of the after-tax rate of interest,
if no Thin-Capitalization rule is imposed. Then, a lower interest rate and a higher tax rate
would lead to an increase in the leverage. But, if a Thin-Capitalization rule is imposed in the
host country and is binding, the leverage will be reduced and will show less tax sensitivity.
In order to empirically test these predictions we first specify an estimation equation for the
leverage of an investment in country j held by company k in period t
LEVj,k,t = a0 + a1xj,k,t + a2τj,t + a3 log ij,t + a4THCj,t + a5τj,tTHCj,t + ak + at + 
LEV
j,k,t .
where at is a time-specific and ak is a company-specific effect. Note that the former also
captures the interest rate at the parent location if we consider a set of companies which
share the same parent location. The company-specific effect encompasses the company-
specific opportunity cost of capital which might include elements of personal taxation at
the level of the shareholder. It will also control for company-specific determinants of the
agency cost of debt. xj,k,t captures further characteristics of the subsidiary which affect the
use of debt or the access to credit. As the interest rate ij,t is more difficult to measure,
instead of using the after-tax rate of interest (1− τj,t) ij,t, the above specification separates
out interest and tax rates and makes use of the fact, that the tax rate can be regarded as
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an approximation to the log of unity minus tax rate. In order to allow for the case where a
Thin-Capitalization rule is imposed we introduce a dummy THCj,t indicating whether such
a rule is imposed or not, where we expect a4 to show a negative sign. To test for the reduced
tax sensitivity we include a further interaction term with the tax rate where a5 should show
the opposite sign than a2. Note that the estimation simply introduces information about the
existence of a Thin-Capitalization rule but no further information about how likely it may be
that the constraints will restrict the capital structure choice of the individual corporation.
This reflects first-of all the difficulty to assess in greater detail the specific rules in each
country. Moreover, we should note that whether or not a rule is binding is co-determined by
the government and the individual company. Therefore, the use of information about how
likely the rule is binding raises problems of identification.
With regard to the stock of capital invested by the affiliate an empirical analysis is much more
involved as the production function as well as the market conditions for the final product
will be different for each firm and investment - even if we have neglected those differences in
the theoretical analysis. Hence, it might be useful to include further controls which capture
differences in the cost of production, as, for instance, labor cost or distance as an indicator
of transport cost, or which capture product-market conditions as the market size, proxied,
for instance, by the level of GDP. Of course, some of the details of the tax system need
also to be taken into account. In fact, whereas the theoretical analysis above was essentially
concerned with the statutory tax rate, in case of investment the depreciation allowances
should be taken into account as well. The tax savings from depreciation are introduced by
12
means of an interaction term of the present value of depreciation allowances (dj,t) with the
statutory tax rate, formally denoted by dj,tτi,t.
Following the above theoretical discussion a reasonable specification for the amount of capital
invested is
logCAPj,k,t = b0 + b1zj,k,t + b2τj,t + b3ij,t (6)
+ b4THCj,t + b5THCj,tτj,t + b6dj,tτj,t + bk + bt + 
CAP
j,k,t .
where bt is a time-specific and bk is a company-specific effect. zj,k,t contains several controls,
which may or may not be company specific. These will reflect differences in the market
size, in the local production cost, or in variables which affect the capital structure choice as
captured above by xj,k,t.
As above, we might want to test the implications of Thin-Capitalization rules. To test for an
impact on the level of investment we introduce a dummy for the imposition of such rules in
the host country. A different tax sensitivity of the capital stock is tested for by an interaction
term between the Thin-Capitalization dummy and the statutory tax rate, where b5 should
be negative if the tax sensitivity is increased.
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4 Data and Descriptive Statistics
The empirical analysis employs micro-level data for multinationals provided by the German
Bundesbank. This includes a comprehensive annual database of direct investment stocks
of German enterprises held abroad. More precisely, the data provides information about
each foreign subsidiary’s balance sheet and some further information about the ownership
and about the German investor. In its current version, firm-level panel data for foreign
subsidiaries are available for the period 1996 to 2004. Data collection is enforced by German
law, which determines reporting mandates for international transactions.6
Since our model is concerned with a multinational corporation which jointly determines
the capital structure at both affiliates we focus on majority owned subsidiaries. As the
model assumes a two-tier company structure, also indirectly held investment is excluded.
Furthermore, as the underlying model deals with a case where production takes place at each
location, holdings and financial service providers as well as observations with non-positive
capital and turnover are excluded.
In order to capture the tax incentive on the capital structure, the analysis employs the statu-
tory tax rate on corporate income modified by applicable restrictions on interest deductions,
6Sec. 26 Aussenwirtschaftsgesetz (Law on Foreign Trade and Payments) in connection with Aussen-
wirtschaftsverordnung (Foreign Trade and Payment Regulations). Each German multinational has to report
its foreign assets including both direct FDI and indirect FDI conditional on some lower threshold level for
mandatory reporting. Since 2002, FDI has to be reported, if the participation is 10% or more and the balance
sheet total of the foreign object is above 3 Million Euro. For details see Lipponer (2006). Though previous
years showed lower threshold levels, we apply this threshold level uniformly for all years in the panel.
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Table 1: Descriptive Statistics
Variable Mean Std.Dev. Min. Max.
Firm level variables
Property, Plant, and Equipment (PPE) (e 1 Mill.) 10.3 101 .0001 14,400
Turnover (e 1 Mill.) 50.7 344 1 51,900
Leverage .609 .249 .0002 1
Loss carry-forward .293 .455 0 1
Tax variables
Statutory tax rate .344 .071 .1 .532
PVD (d) .795 .054 .664 .914
Thin-Capitalization dummy .772 .420 0 1
Further characteristics
Lending rate 7.17 3.99 1.77 27.31
Hourly labor cost (US $) 16.56 .644 2.73 34.64
GDP (Bill. US $) 1,685 2,866 17.5 11,734
Distance (in km) 1,963 3,126 190 16,431
Corruption perception 6.92 1.73 3.42 10.0
43,626 observations representing 24 countries observed over the period 1996 to 2004.
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such as in the case of the Italian local business tax (IRAP). Thus, the statutory tax rate
represents the tax savings from deducting one unit of interest.
Since the effective tax reduction from using debt might be zero if a subsidiary carries forward
any losses for tax purposes (MacKie-Mason, 1990), we also use a dummy variable indicating
whether some loss carry-forward is reported. Of course, the existence of some losses in
the previous periods may capture other characteristics of the current decision problem of
the company, such as the expected performance of an affiliate. Thus, the overall effect on
leverage might well be ambiguous.
As the firm-level data does not provide any information about firm-specific interest ex-
penses, we employ the lending rates for the private sector taken from the IMF International
Financial Yearbook augmented, where possible, with data from the European Central Bank.
Furthermore, in order to control for company-specific variation in the borrowing conditions
we employ the turnover, as an indicator of the size and the cash-flow of the affiliate both
of which will generally be positively associated with the borrowing conditions faced by the
affiliate. As agency cost may also vary across industries, we control for further heterogeneity
by including dummies for 71 industries at the level of the affiliate.
With regard to the analysis of the level of capital we employ some additional controls.
This includes hourly labor cost in manufacturing as available from the Bureau of Economic
Analysis. We also employ a distance variable which has proved important in previous analysis
of FDI. This variable will capture the distance of the foreign affiliate to its German parent.
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Table 2: German Outbound FDI 1996 - 2004
Host Country Observations Capital Share of TCR
(e 1,000) Debt
Number Percent Mean Mean
Australia 958 2.20 17,757 .620 1
Austria 2,590 5.94 25,429 .606 0
Belgium 1,868 4.28 38,768 .631 1
Canada 782 1.79 30,501 .534 1
Czech Republic 2,534 5.81 25,781 .614 1
Denmark 757 1.74 19,145 .654 1 b)
Finland 355 0.81 24,937 .556 0
France 5,456 12.51 26,439 .643 1
Great Britain 3,710 8.50 29,535 .590 1
Greece 404 0.93 22,246 .651 0
Hungary 1,591 3.65 36,795 .561 1 a)
Ireland 363 0.83 20,856 .506 0
Italy 3,289 7.54 29,036 .720 0 d)
Japan 1,096 2.51 55,661 .670 1
Luxembourg 41 0.09 17,188 .702 1 c)
Netherlands 2,354 5.40 28,554 .576 1
Norway 370 0.85 22,843 .603 0
Poland 2,949 6.76 19,905 .602 1 b)
Portugal 573 1.31 26,079 .561 0
Slovakia 466 1.07 31,423 .569 1 e)
Spain 2,729 6.26 33,348 .607 1
Sweden 1,041 2.39 20,701 .616 0
Switzerland 2,931 6.72 19,025 .547 1
USA 4,419 10.13 55,861 .582 1
Total 43,626 100.00 30,557 .609 .772
a): since 1997, b): since 1999, c): since 2002, d): since 2004, e): abolished 2004.
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In order to capture the market size we include a GDP variable. The list of variables is
further augmented by a corruption perception index as the prevalence of corruption may
deter foreign direct investment (e.g., Wei, 2002). Finally, of course, we utilize a dummy
variable reporting the existence of Thin-Capitalization rules in the host country. While this
variable is based on annual information it shows only weak variation over time. The countries
considered seem to have adjusted their Thin-Capitalization rule only rarely. Table 1 provides
descriptive statistics for the main variables used.
Table 2 provides some descriptive statistics on the size and geographic distribution of the
foreign subsidiaries analyzed. The list of host countries includes 24 countries, 14 of these
countries are EU members before 2004, 3 have joined the EU in 2004.
5 Results
The results for the leverage as presented in Table 3 show a significant positive impact of the
tax rate: an increase in the tax rate by 10 percentage points results in an increase in the
leverage by 3.4 to 4.4 percentage points depending on the specification. With a coefficient of
about 0.35 the size of the coefficient in specification (2) is remarkably close to the finding of
Desai, Foley, and Hines (2004) who report an impact of 0.33 in a similar specification, which
also uses company-level fixed effects but replaces the local lending rate with several credit-
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market indicators.7 Specification (2) also shows a positive impact of the turnover which is
in accordance to a positive impact of liquidity on the access to credit. The lending rate of
the host country does not show much significance. However, as shown by Desai et al. (2004)
and confirmed in Buettner et al. (2006), the local lending rate exerts offsetting effects on
external and internal debt, where the latter might be more sensitive to the lending rate at the
parent’s location, which is absorbed by the time-specific effects. In column (3) the dummy
for the existence of a Thin-Capitalization rule shows the expected negative effect suggesting
that the leverage is about 5 percentage points lower in countries imposing such financing
constraints. Column (4) reports results of a specification where, in addition, an interaction
effect between the tax rate and the Thin-Capitalization dummy is included. The significant
negative impact indicates that the tax sensitivity is reduced in countries which impose such
constraints. Summing up our findings so far, the analysis of the capital structure supports
the theoretical predictions. Affiliates in countries which impose Thin-Capitalization rules do
have a lower leverage and do show a lower tax-sensitivity of the leverage.
A problem with the above analysis is that we have treated the tax policy in terms of tax
rates and in terms of the imposition of restrictions on interest deduction as being unrelated.
However, one might argue that not all countries are equally likely to impose debt restrictions.
Rather, high-tax countries which should be the prime focus of tax-planning seem more likely
to impose those rules. If the impact of the tax rate is non-linear, perhaps due to the convexity
7Gordon and Lee (2001) report a leverage effect of taxes using US firm-level data of about 0.36. Mintz
and Weichenrieder (2005) report results for foreign affiliates of German corporations of between 0.3 and 0.57
depending on specification. Huizinga, Laeven, and Nicode`me (2006) report a somewhat lower estimate of
0.27 for a sample of European corporations.
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of the agency cost, the interaction term with the Thin-Capitalization dummy might simply
reflect the higher tax-sensitivity of high-tax countries. But, as can be seen from column (6)
employing a quadratic specification, there is no evidence for corresponding non-linearities.
Note that other non-linear specifications also failed to show significance.
Table 4 provides results for the size of the capital stock invested as captured by the level
of Property, Plant, and Equipment (PPE). All estimations account for company-level as
well as time and industry-level fixed effects. The first column employs a specification where
the tax rate as well as its interaction with the depreciation allowances are considered. In
accordance with theoretical predictions, a lower statutory tax rate and higher tax savings
due to tax depreciation are both associated with a higher level of investment.8 With regard
to the further control variables we may note, first, that the lending rate proves insignificant.
One might have expected a negative effect, but, as noted above, if the local lending rate
is high, relatively, external debt might become substituted by internal debt, which will not
be responsive to the local lending rate. If no control for the turnover is included, the GDP
shows a positive effect pointing to a positive role of the market size. Labor cost show a
negative effect which is in accordance with the view that investment decisions are deterred
by high labor cost provided that there is no strong capital-labor substitution in the choice
of technology. While distance shows no effect in the basic estimation, the perception of
8While the statutory tax rate was adjusted in order to take account of special provisions for debt finance
(see above), for the purpose of studying investment, both the basic statutory tax as well as the adjusted tax
rate would matter. However, probably due to the rather small differences between the two tax rates, various
alternative specification showed no significant differences.
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Table 3: Results: Determinants of the Leverage
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Tax rate .376 ? .347 ? .337 ? .434 ? .441 ?
(.044) (.045) (.039) (.052) (.198)
Tax rate square -.010
(.266)
TCR -.050 ? -.002 -.002
(.009) (.025) (.025)
TCR × Tax rate -.141 ? -.142 ?
(.077) (.080)
(log)Lending rate .005 .011 ? .006 .003 .003
(.006) (.006) (.006) (.007) (.007)
Loss carry-forward .053 ? .056 ? .059 ? .059 ? .059 ?
(.004) (.004) (.004) (.004) (.004)
(log)Turnover .002 .009 ? .010 ? .010 ? .010 ?
(.002) (.002) (002) (.002) (.002)
Industry effects no yes yes yes yes
R2 .0404 .0660 .0749 .0752 .0752
Dependent variable: Debt/asset ratio of foreign subsidiaries. Company-level and time
fixed effects included. Standard errors in parentheses are robust against random firm-
specific, time, and country effects using the usual Huber-White sandwich formula. An
asterisk denotes significance at 5% level. 43626 observations, 4256 firms.
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Table 4: Results: Determinants of PPE
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Tax rate -1.95 ? -1.90 ? -1.45 ? -1.67 ? -1.63 ? -1.27 ? -1.21
(.957) (.912) (.862) (.709) (.681) (.652) (.1.10)
Tax rate squared -.081
(1.17)
Tax rate × PVD 1.62 1.64 ? 2.89 ? 1.16 1.17 2.21 ? 2.20 ?
(.999) (.958) (.943) (.754) (.721) (.698) (.703)
TCR .088 ? .861 ? .070 ? .706 ? .707 ?
(.039) (.131) (.027) (.116) (.117)
Tax rate × TCR -2.22 ? -1.83 ? -1.83 ?
(.338) (.309) (.313)
(log) Lend. rate -.001 .012 -.010 .009 .019 .001 .000
(.043) (.044) (.040) (.032) (.033) (.030) (.030)
(log) GDP .194 ? .177 ? .166 ? .012 -.001 -.010 -.010
(.018) (.016) (.015) (.014) (.013) (.012) (.012)
(log) Labor cost -.191 ? -.149 ? -.153 ? -.263 ? -.229 ? -.232 ? -.232 ?
(.042) (.038) (.036) (.031) (.030) (.028) (.028)
(log) Distance .002 .011 .044 ? .053 ? .060 ? .087 ? .087 ?
(.020) (.018) (.018) (.016) (.015) (.015) (.015)
(log) Corruption .172 ? .125 ? .233 ? .168 ? .131 ? .219 ? .218 ?
(.066) (.068) (.066) (.055) (.059) (.056) (.062)
(log) Turnover .748 ? .748 ? .747 ? .747 ?
(.013) (.013) (.013) (.013)
Loss carry-forw. .096 ? .094 ? .100 ? .100 ?
(.016) (.016) (.016) (.016)
R2 .2426 .2430 .2446 .4138 .4141 .4151 .4151
Dependent variable: logarithm of property, plant, and equipment (PPE) of foreign sub-
sidiaries. Company level, time, and industry fixed effects included. Standard errors in
parentheses are robust against random firm-specific, time, and country effects using the
usual Huber-White sandwich formula. An asterisk denotes significance at 5% level. 43626
observations, 4256 firms.
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corruption shows the expected adverse effect.9
Specification (2) includes the dummy for the existence of a Thin-Capitalization rule. Ac-
cordingly, the level of capital invested is higher in countries which impose such rules. While
one can speculate whether this is attributable to the difficulties in capturing all determinants
of investment decisions, we should note that this result deviates from the theoretical predic-
tions. Specification (3) includes the interaction term with the statutory tax rate which exerts
a significant negative effect. This supports the above hypothesis of a higher tax sensitivity
of capital if a Thin-Capitalization rule is imposed. This specification shows a strong increase
in the value of the Thin-Capitalization dummy as well, but an evaluation of this coefficient
around the mean reveals that the mean difference in the level of PPE between countries
imposing restrictions and those, which don’t, is preserved. Columns (4) to (6) of Table 4
report results, where we include, in addition, two firm-specific controls, turnover and loss
carry-forward, which have been used in the above leverage regressions. The results do not
change much, except that distance now shows strong positive effects. This seems reasonable
given that the specification conditions on the attractiveness of the market as captured by
the turnover variable.
The wrong sign of the Thin-Capitalization dummy again points at the above mentioned prob-
lem that we have not explored the reasons behind the decision to impose debt-restrictions.
Again, to make sure that the interaction with the Thin-Capitalization dummy is not just
reflecting a higher tax-sensitivity of high-tax countries, we tested for nonlinear effects in the
9Note that the index is computed such that a lower perception results in a higher value.
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tax rate. Representative for those estimations, the table reports a specification with the
squared tax rate in column (7) which does not show a significant impact. Thus, once again,
the significance of the interaction effect between Thin-Capitalization rule and the tax rate
cannot simply be ascribed to non-linearities in the impact of the tax rate.
We can summarize the results for the level of investment in terms of property, plant, and
equipment by stating that the theoretical expectations are met only partly by the empirical
evidence. While we could not find an adverse effect of the existence of Thin-Capitalization
rules on the level of investment, the tax sensitivity is found to be increased. To some extent
the failure to get stronger results is related to the low time-series variation in the imposition
of Thin-Capitalization rules which prevent the use of more robust empirical approaches as
for instance the inclusion of country-specific effects.
6 Conclusions
The theoretical analysis has shown that the imposition of Thin-Capitalization rules tends
to reduce the leverage and the capital stock of affiliates located in countries imposing such
rules. Further comparative static effects point at a lower tax sensitivity of the debt-asset
ratio in countries imposing those rules. The tax sensitivity of the capital stock invested in a
country should, however, be increased in the presence of Thin-Capitalization rules.
The empirical investigation of the leverage and the value of property, plant, and equipment
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of the affiliates of German multinationals in 24 countries in the period between 1996 and
2004 offers some support for the theoretical predictions. The leverage in countries with
Thin-Capitalization rules is found to be reduced significantly, suggesting that these rules
cannot easily be circumvented. Also the lower tax sensitivity of the leverage is confirmed
in the estimations. While there is some reason to believe that Thin-Capitalization rules are
mainly imposed by high-tax countries, the results indicate that the higher tax sensitivity is
not simply caused by non-linear effects in the tax rate.
With regard to the level of property, plant, and equipment held by an affiliate, the analysis
confirms the usual determinants found in previous empirical studies: lower tax rates, a
higher present value of tax depreciation allowances, a higher level of GDP, and a lower level
of corruption all exert positive effects. While the sensitivity to the statutory tax rate is
found to be higher in countries where a Thin-Capitalization rule is imposed, the amount
of capital invested is not lower in countries, which impose a Thin-Capitalization rule. Of
course, this result may be due to some omitted variable problem. But, the low variation in
the imposition of Thin-Capitalization rules over time prevents us from further exploration
of this point.
The higher tax sensitivity of investment under the restriction of a Thin-Capitalization rule
suggests that the adverse consequences of taxation on investment become stronger if the
government imposes those restrictions. In a non-cooperative setting, therefore, tax policy
faces a difficult trade-off between the real consequences of corporate taxation and the rev-
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enue loss from the tax-planning of multinationals. As not restricting tax-planning would
basically mean that the tax system discriminates against locally operating firms, and, thus,
also distorts the decision to operate multinationally rather than domestically (Bucovetsky
and Haufler, 2005), there seem to be good reasons to impose restrictions on interest deduc-
tion. Thus, the higher tax sensitivity of investment under those constraints predicted by
the theory and confirmed by the empirical analysis suggests that an optimal policy should
combine a restriction on tax-planning by means of debt finance with a reduction in the over-
all tax burden on corporate profits. Just by imposing restrictions, policy cannot escape the
fundamental question about the corporation tax raised by the process of globalization.
Datasources and Definitions
Firm-level data are taken from the micro-level dataset (MiDi) of the Bundesbank, see
Lipponer (2006) for an overview. The leverage is determined by the level of balance-
sheet liabilities divided by total capital consisting of registered capital, capital reserves
and profit reserves.
Corporate taxation data are taken from the IBFD, and from tax surveys provided by the
tax advisory companies Ernst&Young, PwC and KPMG. The statutory tax rate vari-
able contains statutory profit tax rates modified by applicable restrictions on interest
deductions.
Thin-Capitalization information is from the same source as the tax data.
Present values of depreciation are calculated for investments in machinery, assuming a
discount rate of 7.1 percent. Depreciation rules are taken from the references considered
in case of corporate taxation data (see above).
Lending rates refer to credits to the private sector taken from the IMF International Fi-
nancial Yearbook (2005) augmented with corresponding ECB figures.
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GDP in U.S. Dollars, nominal. Source: World Economic Outlook Database.
Hourly compensation of workers: Hourly compensation costs in U.S. Dollars for pro-
duction workers in manufacturing. Source: U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics and Euro-
stat.
Distance is taken from “www.etn.nl/distance.htm”.
Corruption Perception Index is published annually by Transparency International which
ranks countries in terms of perceived levels of corruption, as determined by expert as-
sessments and opinion surveys. The scores used range from 10 (country perceived as
virtually corruption-free) to 0 (country perceived as almost totally corrupt).
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